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Abstract—Mobile nodes in military environments such
as a battlefield or a hostile region are likely to suffer
from intermittent network connectivity and frequent
partitions. Disruption-tolerant network (DTN)
technologies are becoming successful solutions that allow
wireless devices carried by soldiers to communicate with
each other and access the confidential information or
command reliably by exploiting external storage nodes.
Some of the most challenging issues in this scenario are
the enforcement of authorization policies and the policies
update for secure data retrieval. Cipher text-policy
attribute-based encryption (CP-ABE) is a promising
cryptographic solution to the access control issues.
However, the problem of applying CP-ABE in
decentralized DTNs introduces several security and
privacy challenges with regard to the attribute
revocation, key escrow, and coordination of attributes
issued from different authorities. In this paper, we
propose a secure data retrieval scheme using CP-ABE
for decentralized DTNs where multiple key authorities
manage their attributes independently. We demonstrate
how to apply the proposed mechanism to securely and
efficiently manage the confidential data distributed in
the disruption-tolerant military network.
Key words: Access control, attribute-based encryption
(ABE), disruption-tolerant network (DTN), Secure data
retrieval,multi authority, CP-ABE.
I. Introduction
For authentication, authorization and access control
passwords are used. The password is selected by the user is
predictable. This happens with both graphical and text based
passwords. Users chooses memorable password,
unfortunately it means that the passwords follow the
predictable patterns that are very easy for guessing to the
attacker. While allowing passwords to the user randomly the
usability issues occurs, means user cannot remember the
random passwords. There are number of graphical password
systems has been developed; text-based passwords suffer
with both security and usability problems. We well know
that the human brain is better at remembering and recalling
images than text, graphical passwords. The password
method is very common method for the authentication
purpose. This passwords used for safely login to emails over
internet, sharing of data and transferring of files. Password
causes some drawbacks like forgetting the password, very
weak password or having less characters etc, So to secure
the data and all application we have to provide a strong
authentication as we using passwords in the military areas.
So to provide high or strong authentication the new
technique is introduced called as graphical password
technique. The drawback of alphanumeric password is
dictionary attack. So the graphical password technique
improves the password techniques.
So the as an alternative to the alphanumeric password
graphical password technique is used. As human brain can
capable of remembering the images, pictures so this
technique is designed to overcome the weakness and
drawbacks of the traditional technique. The main drawbacks
for the current graphical password schemes are the shoulder
The last challenge is the coordination of attributes issued
from different authorities. When multiple authorities
manage and issue attribute keys to users independently with
their own master secrets, it is very hard to define fine-
grained access policies over attributes issued from different
authorities. For example, suppose that attributes “role 1”
and “region 1” are managed by the authority A, and “role 2”
and “region 2” are managed by the authority B. Then, it is
impossible to generate an access policy ((“role 1” OR “role
2”) AND (“region 1” or “region 2”)) in the previous
schemes because the OR logic between attributes issued
from different authorities cannot be implemented. This is
due to the fact that the different authorities generate their
own attribute keys using their own independent and
individual master secret keys. Therefore, general access
policies, such as “-out-of-” logic, cannot be expressed in the
previous schemes, which is a very practical and commonly
required access policy logic.
II. Related Work
ABE comes in two flavours called key-policy ABE (KP-
ABE) and cipher text-policy ABE (CP-ABE). In KP-ABE,
the encrypt or only gets to label a cipher text with a set of
attributes. The key authority chooses a policy for each user
that determines which cipher texts he can decrypt and issues
the key to each user by embedding the policy into the user’s
key. However, the roles of the cipher texts and keys are
reversed in CP-ABE. In CP-ABE, the cipher text is
encrypted with an access policy chosen by an encrypt or, but
a key is simply created with respect to an attributes set. CP-
ABE is more appropriate to DTNs than KP-ABE because it
enables encrypt or such as a commander to choose an access
policy on attributes and to encrypt confidential data under
the access structure via encrypting with the corresponding
public keys or attributes.
1) Attribute Revocation:
Bettencourtet al. and Boldyreva et al. first suggested key
revocation mechanisms in CP-ABE and KP-ABE,
respectively. Their solutions are to append to each attribute
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an expiration date (or time) and distribute a new set of keys
to valid users after the expiration. The periodic attribute
revocable ABE schemes have two main problems. The first
problem is the security degradation in terms of the backward
and forward secrecy. It is a considerable scenario that users
such as soldiers may change their attributes frequently, e.g.,
position or location move when considering these as
attributes. Then, a user who newly holds the attribute might
be able to access the previous data encrypted before he
obtains the attribute until the data is reencrypted with the
newly updated attribute keys by periodic rekeying
(backward secrecy). For example, assume that at time, a
ciphertext is encrypted with a policy that can be decrypted
with a set of attributes (embedded in the users keys) for
users with. After time, say, a user newly holds the attribute
set. Even if the new user should be disallowed to decrypt the
ciphertext for the time instance, he can still decrypt the
previous ciphertext until it is reencrypted with the newly
updated attribute keys. On the other hand, a revoked user
would still be able to access the encrypted data even if he
does not hold the attribute any more until the next expiration
time (forward secrecy). For example, when a user is
disqualified with the attribute at time , he can still decrypt
the ciphertext of the previous time instance unless the key of
the user is expired and the ciphertext is reencrypted with the
newly updated key that the user cannot obtain. We call this
uncontrolled period of time windows of vulnerability.
The other is the scalability problem. The key authority
periodically announces a key update material by uncast at
each time-slot so that all of the none revoked users can
update their keys. This results in the “1-affects” problem,
which means that the update of a single attribute affects he
wholeno revoked users who share the attribute. This could
be a bottleneck for both the key authority and all no revoked
users. The immediate key revocation can be done by
revoking users using ABE that supports negative clauses. To
do so, one just adds conjunctively the AND of negation of
revoked user identities (where each is considered as an
attribute here).
However, this solution still somewhat lacks efficiency
performance. This scheme will pose overhead group
elements1 additively to the size of the ciphertext and
multiplicatively to the size of private key over the original
CP-ABE scheme of Bettencourtet al., where is the
maximum size of revoked attributes set. Golle et al. also
proposed a user revocable KP-ABE scheme, but their
scheme only works when the number of attributes
associated with a ciphertext is exactly half of the universe
size.
2) Key Escrow:
Most of the existing ABE schemes are constructed on the
architecture where a single trusted authority has the power
to generate the whole private keys of users with its master
secret information. Thus, the key escrow problem is
inherent such that the key authority can decrypt every
ciphertext addressed to users in the system by generating
their secret keys at any time. Chase et al. presented a
distributed KP-ABE scheme that solves the key escrow
problem in a multiauthority system. In this approach, all
(disjoint) attribute authorities are participating in the key
generation protocol in a distributed way such that they
cannot pool their data and link multiple attribute sets
belonging to the same user. One disadvantage of this fully
distributed approach is the performance degradation. Since
there is no centralized authority with master secret
information, all attribute authorities should communicate
with each other in the system to generate a user’s secret key.
This results in communication overhead on the system setup
and the rekeying phases and requires each user to store
additional auxiliary key components besides the attributes
keys, where is the number of authorities in the system.
3) Decentralized ABE:
Huang et al. and Roy et al. proposed decentralized CP-ABE
schemes in the multiauthority network environment. They
achieved a combined access policy over the attributes issued
from different authorities by simply encrypting data
multiple times. The main disadvantages of this approach are
efficiency and expressiveness of access policy. For example,
when a commander encrypts a secret mission to soldiers
under the policy (“Battalion 1” AND (“Region 2” OR
‘Region 3”)), it cannot be expressed when each “Region”
attribute is managed by different authorities, since simply
multiencrypting approaches can by no means express any
general “ -out-of- ” logics (e.g., OR, that is 1-out-of- ). For
example, let be the key authorities, and be attributes sets
they independently manage, respectively. Then, the only
access policy expressed with is , which can be achieved by
encrypting a message with by , and then encrypting the
resulting ciphertext with by (where is the cipher text
encrypted under ), and then encrypting resulting ciphertext
with by , and so on, until this multiencryption generates the
final ciphertext . Thus, the access logic should be only
AND, and they require iterative encryption operations
where is the number of attribute authorities. Therefore, they
are somewhat restricted in terms of expressiveness of the
access policy and require computation and storage costs.
Chase and Lewko et al. proposed multiauthority KP-ABE
and CP-ABE schemes, respectively. However, their
schemes also suffer from the key escrow problem like the
prior decentralized schemes.
B. Contribution
In this system, we propose an attribute-based secure data
retrieval scheme using CP-ABE for decentralized DTNs.
The proposed scheme features the following achievements.
First, immediate attribute revocation enhances
backward/forward secrecy of confidential data by reducing
the windows of vulnerability. Second, encrypt or can define
a fine-grained access policy using any monotone access
structure under attributes issued from any chosen set of
authorities. Third, the key escrow problem is resolved by an
escrow-free key issuing protocol that exploits the
characteristic of the decentralized DTN architecture. The
key issuing protocol generates and issues user secret keys by
performing a secure two-party computation (2PC) protocol
among the key authorities with their own master secrets.
The 2PC protocol deters the key authorities from obtaining
any master secret information of each other such that none
of them could generate the whole set of user keys alone.
Thus, users are not required to fully trust the authorities in
order to protect their data to be shared. The data
confidentiality and privacy can be cryptographically
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enforced against any curious key authorities or data storage
nodes in the proposed scheme.
Fig 1: Architecture of secure data retrieval in a disruption-
tolerant military network.
1) Data confidentiality: Unauthorized users who do not
have enough credentials satisfying the access policy should
be deterred from accessing the plain data in the storage
node. In addition, unauthorized access from the storage
node or key authorities should be also prevented.
2) Collusion-resistance: If multiple users collude, they may
be able to decrypt a cipher text by combining their attributes
even if each of the users cannot decrypt the cipher text
alone.
3) Backward and forward Secrecy: In the context of ABE,
backward secrecy means that any user who comes to hold
an attribute (that satisfies the access policy) should be
prevented from accessing the plaintext of the previous data
exchanged before he holds the attribute. On the other hand,
forward secrecy means that any user who drops an attribute
should be prevented from accessing the plaintext of the
subsequent data exchanged after he drops the attribute,
unless the other valid attributes that he is holding satisfy the
access policy.
III. Problem Statement
The problem of a system is to maintain secure data retrieval
scheme using CP-ABE for decentralized DTNs where
multiple key authorities manage their attributes
independently. We demonstrate how to apply the proposed
mechanism to securely and efficiently manage the
confidential data distributed in the disruption-tolerant
military network.
FIG:2 Architeture Diagram
IV. Modules For Development
B. User Module:
Sender: In this module, the Sender is responsible for
registering the Users by providing details Name, Password,
Confirm Password, Battalion (b1,b2,b3),
Region(R1,R2,R3). Sender Browses the data File, encrypts
it and gets the key from Key Authority Server (KA1, KA2,
and KA3). Uploads their data files to the Storage Node and
sender is authenticated to provide privileges for End User.
Disruption Tolerant Network Router: The Disruption
Tolerant Network Router (DTN) technologies are becoming
successful solutions in military applications that allow
wireless devices to communicate with each other and access
the confidential information reliably by exploiting external
storage nodes. In this module we introduced storage nodes
in DTNs where data is stored or replicated such that only
authorized mobile nodes can access the necessary
information quickly and efficiently. In DTN encrypted data
file and details will be stored Storage Node.
Key Authority: The key authority (KA1, KA2, and KA3) is
responsible to generate the secret key for the file belongs to
the particular Battalion and region. The End User Request to
the storage node using the file Name, secret key, Battalion
and Region, Then storage node connect to the respective
Key authority server. If all specified Details are correct then
file will sent to the end user, or else he will be blocked in a
storage node. The Key Authority server can view the users,
privileges, keys. Thus, the key authority can decrypt every
cipher text addressed to specific users by generating their
attribute keys.
End User: In this module, the End user can access the file
details and end user who will request and gets file contents
response from the DTN Router. If the credential file name
and secret key is correct then the end user will get the file
response from the router in Decrypted format.
Threat model: Threat model is one who is trying to access
the file which is belongs to other user by injecting the fake
details to the file in the storage node is considered as
Attacker. The attacker can be Data confidentiality or
collusion-resistance.
1) Data confidentiality: Unauthorized users who
do not have enough credentials satisfying the
access policy should be deterred from
accessing the plain data in the storage node. In
addition, unauthorized access from the storage
node or key authorities should be also
prevented.
2) Collusion-resistance: Suppose there exist a
user with attributes {”Battalion 1”, “Region
1”} and another user with attributes
{”Battalion 2”, “Region 2”}. They may
succeed in decrypting a cipher text encrypted
under the access policy of (“Battalion 1” AND
“Region 2”), even if each of them cannot
decrypt it individually. We do not want these
colluders to be able to decrypt the secret
information by combining their attributes. We
also consider collusion attack among curious
local authorities to derive users keys.
V. Functional And Non Functional
Requirement Specification:
This Chapter describes about the requirements. It specifies
the hardware and software requirements that are required in
order to run the application properly. The Software
Requirement Specification (SRS) is explained in detail,
which includes overview of this dissertation as well as the
functional and non-functional requirement of this
dissertation.
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SRS for Secure Data Retrieval for Decentralized
Disruption-Tolerant Military Networks
Functional Control the Congestion in DTN
Router; Key generation,
Authenticate the users,
multiauthority in key authority
server for key generation, Providing
the access control for each and every
file by generating the keys, Protects
the Files in disruption-tolerant
network, secure data retrieval,
Finding the malicious user.
Non- Functional The Sender and Receiver never Find
the Router performance.
External interface LAN , Routers, WAN
Performance Finding File Attackers Information,
Access control of files in network,
View the Privileges, Viewing the
keys, View the Registered user,
authentication of a user, Encrypt the
contents, attribute based encryption,
End User Can view files available.
Attributes File Management, Attackers, Access
control, attribute-based encryption
(ABE), disruption-tolerant network
(DTN), multiauthority and secure
data retrieval.
Table: 3.1 Summaries of SRS
Functional Requirements
Functional Requirement defines a function of a software
system and how the system must behave when presented
with specific inputs or conditions. These may include
calculations, data manipulation and processing and other
specific functionality. In this system following are the
functional requirements:-
 The Service provider /Sender are responsible for
registering the Users by providing their details,
including Battalion and Region.
 The Service Provider/Sender Browses the data File,
encrypts it and generates the key from Key
Authority Server (KA1, KA2, and KA3) and
uploads file to the destination.
 The DTN Router stores the encrypted data file and
their details in the Storage Node.
 The End User Request to the storage node using
their credentials like file Name, secret key,
Battalion and Region.
 Then storage node connects to the respective Key
authority server. If all credentials are correct then
user is authorized to receive the file.
 If the user gives wrong credentials file name,
secret key, Battalion, Region, then the end user will
considered as non authorized user.
 The Attributes are File Management, Attackers,
Access control, attribute-based encryption (ABE),
disruption-tolerant network (DTN), multiauthority,
secure data retrieval.
Non – Functional Requirements
Non – Functional requirements, as the name
suggests, are those requirements that are not directly
concerned with the specific functions delivered by the
system. They may relate to emergent system properties such
as reliability response time and store occupancy.
Alternatively, they may define constraints on the system
such as the capability of the Input Output devices and the
data representations used in system interfaces. Many non-
functional requirements relate to the system as whole rather
than to individual system features. This means they are
often critical than the individual functional requirements.
The following non-functional requirements are worthy of
attention.
The key non-functional requirements are:
 Security: The system should allow a secured
communication between Sender and Router and
Receiver.
 Energy Efficiency: The Time consumed by the
Router to transfer the File’s Packets from the
Receiver.
 Reliability: The system should be reliable and must
not degrade the performance of the existing system
and should not lead to the hanging of the system.
Results
Screen Shots:
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VI.Conclusion
We have proposed a novel approach which uses sound
signature to recall graphical password click points. No
previously developed system used this approach this system
is helpful when user is logging after a long time. In future
systems other patterns may be used for recalling purpose
like touch of smells, study shows that these patterns are very
useful in recalling the associated objects like images or text.
In this paper, we proposed an efficient and secure data
retrieval method using CP-ABE for decentralized DTNs
where multiple key authorities manage their attributes
independently. The inherent key escrow problem is resolved
such that the confidentiality of the stored data is guaranteed
even under the hostile environment where key authorities
might be compromised or not fully trusted. In addition, the
fine-grained key revocation can be done for each attribute
group. We demonstrate how to apply the proposed
mechanism to securely and efficiently manage the
confidential data distributed in the disruption- tolerant
military network
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